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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - VOLUNTARY NONSUIT - TREATMENT
UNDER MICHIGAN COURT RuLES - In an action for malpractice, after the
plaintiff had rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. In response to an
inquiry as to how he intended to rule upon the motion, the trial judge indicated
that he would have to grant the motion. Plaintiff then moved for a voluntary
nonsuit, but the judge proceeded to direct a verdict for the defendant. He later
granted a motion to vacate the order directing a verdict and to set aside the
verdict and judgment. Defendant sought mandamus to compel the trial judge
to reinstate the directed verdict and judgment. Held, that under. the Michigan
Court Rules 1 the plaintiff had a right to a voluntary nonsuit.2 Wicks v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 299 Mich. 252, 300 N. W. 75 (1941).3
At common law, as a general rule, the plaintiff was entitled to talce a nonsuit at any time before the verdict, although some courts limited this to the time
when the jury retired to consider its verdict. 4 The time within which the

1 "Plaintiff may at any time, upon notice to the defendant or his attorney, and
on the payment of costs, discontinue his suit by order filed in the court, except where
recoupment or set-off is asserted by the defendant; and except where a defendant shall
have entered upon his defense in open court, unless with the consent of the defendant."
Michigan Court Rule No. 38, § I (1938).
2 Conceivably the court might have decided that upon the argument on the motion
for a directed verdict the defendant would be taken to have entered upon his defense,
but it has consistently held that such a stage is not reached until a defendant has put
in his evidence on the merits. Mintz v. Soule, 200 Mich. 9, 166 N. W. 491 (1918);
Slowke v. Altermatt, 293 Mich. 360, 292 N. W. 330 (1940).
3 See also Slowke v. Altermatt, 293 Mich. 360, 292 N. W. 330 (1940).
4 Barrett v. Virginian Ry., 250 U. S. 473, 39 S. Ct. 540 (1919); Deneen ,•.
Houghton County Street Ry., 150 Mich. 235, II3 N. W. u26 (1907).
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plaintiff can take a voluntary nonsuit, as of right, has been changed a number
of times by the Supreme Court through its rule-making power. 5 In 1891 the
common-law rule was altered to prohibit a plaintiff from taking a voluntary
nonsuit after the jurors had left the jury box to deliberate upon their verdict. 6
Under the 1916 revision, a plaintiff was allowed a voluntary nonsuit at any
time upon notice to the defendant and payment of costs, except where a recoupment or set-off was asserted. 7 This right was greatly curtailed by the 1931 rules,
which prohibited the dismissal after the answer was filed. 8 The 1933 enactment
corresponded to the 1916 rule/' The rule now in effect, on which the principal
case is based, allows the plaintiff to discontinue 10 at any time before the defendant enters upon his defense,11 thereby making the court rule correspond to
the statutory enactment on the subject.12 Inasmuch as a voluntary nonsuit is
not prejudicial to plaintiff and is not an adjudication on the merits,13 the result
reached under the rule now in effect is an undesirable one. It places the parties
to the action upon an unequal footing, for it places the disposition of the case
within the uncontrolled discretion of the plaintiff, and this permits a plaintiff to
experiment with his action without prejudice to himself and at the expense of
the defendant. Fairness to a defendant 14 who has been put to the trouble and
expense of preparing his defense fo the plaintiff's declaration would seem to
require plaintiff to go through to a judgment,15 without subjecting the defendant to repeated preparation, harassment and expense for which he is not
even adequately compensated by the payment of taxable costs. The principal
case depicts the undesirable effects of the present rule, viz., the plaintiff is able
to determine how the trial judge will rule on the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict, and if the prospective ruling is to be for the defendant, the
Michigan Constitution, art. 7, § 5 (1908) ..
Michigan Circuit Court Rule No. 65, (1891).
7
Michigan Circuit Court Rule No. 43, § 1 (1916).
8
Michigan Court Rule No. 38, § 1 (1931).
9
Michigan Court Rule No. 38, § I (1933). See 16 MICH. ST. B. J. 587 (1937).
10
ccFor the purpose under consideration there is no difference between taking a
nonsuit and discontinuance by motion." Pear v. Graham, 258 Mich. 161 at 165, 241
N. W. 865 (1932).
11
See note 1, supra.
12
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 14335. Until the latest revision of the court
rules, there had been a conflict between the provisions of the statute and the court
rules, but art. 7, § 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1908 vests the Supreme Court
with rule-making power, and its rule on the subject is controlling. Pear v. Graham,
258 Mich. 161, 241 N. W. 865 (1932).
13
Deneen v. Houghton County Street Ry., 150 Mich. 235, II3 N. W. 1126
(1907); Nickels v. Hallen, 247 Mich. 291, 225 N. W. 569 (1929).
14
"It is highly important that the court in the exercise of its discretion should
not only see that equal and exact justice is done between litigants, but it is equally
important that needless litigation should be speedily determined, and in the trial of
cases the court should consider the rights of the defendant as well as those of the
plaintiff••.•" Parks v. Southern Ry., (C. C. A. 4th, 1906) 143 F. 276 at 279.
15
See MICHIGAN PROCEDURE COMMISSION, FINAL AMENDED REPORT 58 (1929).
6
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plaintiff is able to withdraw his case and doctor it up for future presentation. 16
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,17 models in the procedural field, resolve
the problem very conveniently by denying a plaintiff an absolute right to dismiss
after defendant files his answer.18 Thus a voluntary dismissal may be had before
the defendant files his answer, but an abuse of the privilege is prevented by limiting such dismissal to an early stage of the proceedings.19 Such a rule of practice
leaves the plaintiff free to obtain a nonsuit at any time before the defendant
files his answer in the cause. There is no good reason why, after this stage in
the proceedings, the plaintiff should have a right to dismiss, in the absence of
some legitimate excuse. Leave to take a nonsuit thereafter would be within the
sound discretion of the court, for good cause shown.20 This places both parties
upon an equal footing and still protects the plaintiff in the event of some unforeseeable occurrence, by enabling him to take a nonsuit after the answer is filed
for good and sufficient cause shown. It therefore would seem desirable for the
Michigan court to adopt the federal rule to replace the court rule now in effect. 21

16 "The courts are not organized for the purpose of permitting plaintiff in an
.action to experiment with a certain state of facts for the purpose of ascertaining the
,opinion of the court as to the law applicable to the same and then permit him to with'draw from the scene of conflict and state a new cause of action and mend his licks in
.another direction. Such policy, if adopted, would be productive of much mischief, and
should not be tolerated." Parks v. Southern Ry., (C. C. A. 4th, 1906) 143 F. 276
.at 279-280.
17 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States (1937).
16 " • • • an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before-service of the answer or (ii) by filing
a stipulation of dismissal signed by all the parties who have appeared generally in the
action." Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
Rule 41 (a) (1) (1937).
19 Indeed, the federal rule has been criticized because it does not go quite far
,enough. "Guarded as the Rule is, it is subject to criticism, for it would seem to
authorize a plaintiff to dismiss where the defendant had not served an answer but
had moved for summary judgment." 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3037-3038, note
12 (1938).
20 The Court Rules of l 93 l specifically provided that the plaintiff could discontinue after an answer was filed upon a showing supported by affidavits. The federal
rules have a similar provision as to dismissal after answer filed upon good cause shown.
Rule 41 (a) (2). It seems, however, that even in the absence of such provisions in
statutes or court rules the court in its discretion can grant the plaintiff's request to
discontinue. Tucker v. Immanuel Baptist Church, II9 Kan. 30, 237 P. 654 (1925);
'Taylor v. Green, 119 Okla. 297, 249 P. 393 (1926).
21 The provision of the federal rules is somewhat similar to that in the Michigan
:Court Rule No. 38, § l (1931).

